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Abstract 
The paper presents a method of integrating debt management into fiscal policy using 
principles derived from the work of Kalecki. It proposes dividing the government budget up 
into a functional budget containing taxes and expenditure that may affect expenditures in the 
non-financial economy, and a financial budget containing taxes on wealth and higher 
incomes that do not affect expenditures in the real economy, but affect the liquidity of wealth 
portfolios. This gives the government two more or less independent instruments to manage 
economic growth and government debt. The respective balances between the functional and 
financial budgets then affect the fiscal multiplier showing how cases of expansionary fiscal 
contraction, contractionary fiscal expansion, expansionary financial instability, and 
deflationary financial instability may arise. The analysis applies to domestically financed 
debt. 
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The management of government debt plays a key role in public finance. But the discussion 
of it is on the whole driven by political economy considerations. On the one hand fiscal 
conservatives regard any government debt as a drain on future resources, and therefore to 
be avoided. On the other hand, Keynesians tend to dismiss concerns about government 
borrowing by arguing that the future growth assisted by debt-financed fiscal stimulus will 
allow the debt to be repaid. The conservative argument may be true of foreign borrowing, 
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and even perhaps of domestic borrowing under a gold standard, but it is certainly not true of 
domestic borrowing in a credit economy. The Keynesian case, on the other hand, depends 
on assumptions about the fiscal multiplier that need more than just assertions that this ratio 
will be sufficient. Both cases need a more careful analysis of the principles and methods of 
government debt management and its effect on macroeconomic dynamics: the conservative 
case to show the resource constraints on government debt in a credit economy; and the 
Keynesian case to show the effective connections between government debt and the fiscal 
multiplier. This paper provides such an analysis of domestic debt financed using fiscal 
principles derived from the work of Michał Kalecki.  
 
 
1. Debt management and the fiscal balance 
The budget of the government may be divided up into a functional or effective budget, and a 
financial budget. The functional or primary budget contains all the government expenditure in 
the real economy (the provision of public services, welfare payments and subsidies to 
economic activities) together with their financing by taxes on incomes, excluding profits and 
rents, and on trade in the economy. The financial budget contains, on the expenditure side, 
the servicing of government debt and, on the income side, taxes on wealth, including 
financial assets, and taxes on profits and rents: 
 
Fiscal budget = Functional Balance + Balance of Financial Operations  ; 
Functional Budget   = Government Taxation of Incomes and Trade    
- Government Expenditure on Goods, Services and Welfare Transfer Payments  ; 
 
Balance of Financial Operations = Government Taxation of Assets (Real and Financial) 




The balance of the functional, or effective, budget may be called the primary balance. But it 
is perhaps slightly misleading to call this balance the primary balance, since this term is 
normally reserved for the fiscal balance excluding debt servicing, but including taxes on 
assets, profits and rents. The functional balance is more obviously the economically effective 
one, because it is through this balance that incomes and expenditures are affected, for 
example through Keynesian fiscal stimulus or fiscal deflation. The financial budget merely 
affects the liquidity of private sector portfolios and preferences about the composition of 
those portfolios, rather than macroeconomic variables such as income, expenditure and 
employment. 
 
This may be illustrated by Michał Kalecki’s proposal for deficit spending to maintain a high 
level of employment by means of a fiscal deficit, but with the annual cost of servicing 
government debt paid for by a wealth tax, or capital levy, or a tax on on profits, with 
appropriate deductions for investment, equal to the servicing required in that fiscal year. 
These taxes will, in general, fall upon wealthy individuals. But the money will be returned to 
them in proportion to their holdings of government bonds.1 If the financial budget is 
balanced, so that the tax to pay the cost of servicing the debt is returned to the wealthy in 
the form of interest payments on the bonds, then the money in the portfolios of the wealthy 
remains the same, and the money markets can be relied upon to redistribute this liquidity in 
accordance with individual preferences. A crucial advantage of this kind of taxation is that 
does not affect the incentives to invest, in the sense that the liability for a tax on wealth 
depends on the overall value of the portfolio of assets of the wealthy, and not on the share of 
industrial assets in that portfolio. In the case of the profits tax the calculation is a little more 
complicated. But a deduction for business investment can be calibrated in such a way as to 
 
1 ‘… If full employment is maintained by government spending financed by borrowing, the national debt will 
continuously increase. This need not, however, involve any disturbances in output and employment, if the 
interest on the debt is financed by an annual capital tax. The current income, after payment of capital tax, of 
some capitalists will be lower and of some higher… but their aggregate income will remain unaltered…’ Kalecki 
1943/1990, p. 348. See also Toporowski (2020) forthcoming. A wealth tax, or capital levy as a means of 
covering the debt costs of a government, has a long record of support among economists such as David 
Ricardo, Otto Bauer, Joseph Schumpeter, J.A. Hobson, as well as Keynes and Kalecki. 
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maintain the calculated profitability of particular projects.2 Kalecki’s proposal of setting the 
financial balance at zero therefore represents a sustainable debt position that allows the 
government to engage in deficit financing of its functional or effective budget, while at the 




2. Debt management and the fiscal multiplier 
Dividing up the fiscal budget into a functional budget that affects the real economy, and a 
financial budget that just maintains debt payments and the liquidity of the financial system 
overcomes the dilemma that makes fiscal policy ineffective, namely whether the fiscal 
budget is to be used for macroeconomic management (the Keynesian position) or for debt 
management. By splitting the fiscal budget, the government can have two independent 
instruments that can be used target the macro-economy and government debt, satisfying the 
Tinbergen Rule of an independent instrument for every target of economic policy. In this 
case, the targets are economic growth, using the instrument of the functional budget, and 
financial stability (debt management), using the instrument of the government’s financial 
operations. 
 
This feature of the budget arrangement can be illustrated by considering a situation where 
the financial balance (of wealth taxation and financial operations) is positive and greater than 
the functional fiscal deficit. This is the ‘expansionary fiscal contraction’ that made a brief 
appearance in policy discussions a couple of years ago.3 Because the financial budget is 
positive and its balance is greaters than the functional deficit, the government has an overall 
surplus with which to pay off some portion of its debt, at the same time as stimulating the 
economy with its functional deficit. In effect, monetary resources are being transferred from 
 
2 Such taxes can finance a growing debt service in a way that is ‘harmless in the sense that it will have no 
repercussions on output and employment.’ Kalecki ‘The Burden of the National Debt’ 1943/1997, p. 163.  
3 See Nuti 2015 for a summary of the controversy around the fiscal multiplier. 
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rentier capitalists (who are paying more in taxes than they are receiving back in interest on 
government debt and repayments) to entrepreneurs who are receiving as profits the amount 
of the functional fiscal deficit. In effect, the liquidity of rentier capitalists is modestly reduced 
by the difference between the financial budget surplus (which is taxed away from rentiers), 
and the overall fiscal surplus that is returned to holders of government bonds in the process 
of paying off the national debt.4 
 
(Ex post of course the overall budget cannot have an overall surplus, since any excess of 
total revenue over total expenditure can only be transferred to the financial account, there to 
buy in and cancel government debt, or to buy in other assets and, in this way, expand the 
balance sheet of the government. This is further discussed below.) 
 
Somewhat more common than this ‘expansionary fiscal contraction’ is what may be called a 
‘contractionary fiscal expansion’. This may be used to describe a situation in wh ich the 
financial budget of a government is in deficit, and a part of that deficit is financed by running 
a surplus in the functional budget. This kind of fiscal outcome typically results from 
considerations of ‘supply-side economics’, in which wealth taxes are deemed to act as a 
disincentive to business enterprise, and are therefore reduced. At the same time, attempts at 
reducing government expenditure in the functional budget are frustrated by the overall 
surplus in the functional budget that reduces the overall profitability of business and thereby 
moves the economy into recession. Unless the surplus in the functional budget exceeds the 
deficit in the financial budget, the overall government budget remains in deficit, so that 
government debt continues to rise, with a growing financing requirement. Thus efforts at 
stimulating economic growth through reduction in wealth taxation fail.  
 
 
4 Cf. ‘…capital taxation is perhaps the best way to stimulate business and reduce unemployment. It has all the 
merits of financing state expenditure by borrowing, but it is distinguished from borrowing by the advantage of 
the state not becoming indebted.’ (Kalecki 1937/1990, p. 325). 
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Slow growth and rising government debt are not the only consequences of such ‘supply-side’ 
policies. Since governments are contractually obliged to service their national debt, the 
deficit in the financial balance is in effect covered by the transfer of financial resources from 
the real (non-financial) economy into the portfolios of the wealthy asset-holders. The 
implication of a deficit in a government’s financial balances is the rising liquidity in the 
portfolios of the wealthy. This rising liquidity makes the financial system less stable, as the 
overall situation of slow economic growth and rising government debt keeps the wealthy on 
the look-out for more assured returns in other assets and currencies, no matter how delusory 
those returns may turn out to be. 
 
Two further possible outcomes may be identified. One is what may be called ‘expansionary 
financial instability’ where the government operates with a deficit on the functional budget 
and a further deficit on its financial budget, so that there is an even larger overall fiscal 
deficit. The government would have two means of financing such an expansionary policy. 
One would be through monetisation of the overall deficit, using central bank credit to pay for 
the functional and financial deficits. The outcome of this would be rising liquidity in the 
financial system, and the bank accounts of big businesses that would benefit 
disproportionately (with higher profit margins) from the deficit spending in the functional 
budget. Excess liquidity would drain off into asset markets or foreign currency, in the event 
of any alarm in the financial system, for example over growing government indebtedness, or 
an increasing (credit) money supply.  
 
The other means of financing the overall fiscal deficit is through increasing the velocity of 
circulation of existing monetary resources, by issuing of bills or longer-term government 
bonds. These transfer otherwise ‘idle’ balances into circulation in the real economy. 
However, financing a deficit by means of bill issue entails rolling over increasing quantities of 
governments bills. Reliance on long-term bond issues runs the risk of having to raise the 
interest rates on those bonds to effect the portfolio adjustment necessary to absorb the 
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bonds. This can be avoided by means of what is called in the markets ‘operation twist’: 
issuing short-term bills and using the proceeds to buy in long-term bonds5. But this would 
have to be done on such a scale as to raise the price of government bonds, and thereby 
lower their yields. With a given bank balance sheet, it is easy to show that a government, 
relying on the central bank to maintain it’s official policy rate in the money markets, can also 
control the long-term rate of interest on its bonds. But the transactions involved increase the 
velocity of circulation of existing bank deposits. 
 
A sale of governments bonds to the public is paid for by a transfer of bank deposits held by 
the public to the account of the government. If this sale cannot be effected without raising 
the rate of interest on the bonds, then the government can issue short term bills at or just 
slightly above the central bank’s policy rate of interest. These will be readily bought up by 
banks because such bills are a liquid addition to a bank’s balance sheet. Effectively, the bills 
are swapped for bank deposits, which the government then swaps back for its own bonds in 
the secondary market. Given a certain preference for holding government bonds (nowadays 
the main influence on this preference is the regulations on the amount of government bonds 
that institutional investors – pension funds and insurance companies – must hold against 
their given liabilities – see Toporowski 2010) holders of financial securities will now have 
bank deposits to exchange for new bonds issued by the government at its preferred rate of 
interest.6 
 
With government borrowing, the usual monetary circulation is that the government borrows 
bank deposits from the public, which deposits are then returned to the public in the course of 
government expenditure on public services and welfare payments, and payments on 
 
5 ‘If the Government long-term rate of borrowing is so low that nobody is prepared to lend this rate, the 
Government must finance all the Budget deficit by floating debt. It then loses the control of the long-term rate 
unless it is prepared to borrow short over and above the deficit requirements and buy long-term securities 
from the public.’ Kalecki 1943, p. 46. 
6 Cf. Kalecki 1944/1990, where Kalecki suggests that control of long and short term interest rates may be 
achieved through the issue of bills and bonds in similar proportions. 
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government debt (Toporowski 2020). With government financial operations along the yield 
curve, such as ‘operation twist’, this ‘financial circulation’ of money is augmented by 
additional exchange of the public’s bank deposits for Treasury bills issued by the 
government, and the government’s return of those bank deposits to the public in exchange 
for government bonds. As the price of government bonds rises, the government issues new 
new government bonds in exchange for bank deposits, to be then returned to the public with 
government expenditure. Whereas simple government borrowing to finance its expenditure 
requires two exchanges of bank deposits (at bond issue and then at government 
expenditure), operations along the yield curve require at least three exchanges of bank 
deposits: the government acquiring bank deposits in exchange for Treasury bills; the 
government returning the bank deposits to the public in exchange for governments bonds 
from the secondary market; and the government then re-acquiring the bank deposits. The 
same bank deposits may therefore undergo three exchanges in order to control long-term 
interest rates. This is in addition to the two exchanges when government simply borrows in 
order to finance expenditure. 
 
The aim of such operations is of course the issue of government debt at the longest possible 
maturity, in order to fix the rate of interest on that debt and minimise the amount of rolling 
over (issue of new debt to repay maturing debt) of debt. However, while the issue of long-
term debt may extend the average maturity of government debt, control of the terms of that 
issue may require reduction of that average, through the issue of bills. In addition to reducing 
the average maturity of government debt, the issue of bills put government financing at the 
mercy of any possible future change in short-term interest rates. Hence the term used in 
Keynes’s and Kalecki’s time to describe such financing by means of bills issue as ‘floating 
debt’. 
 
The control of the conditions of government borrowing through operations along the yield 
curve or debt management was familiar to Keynes and Kalecki who routinely commented on 
9 
 
war finance and the debt problems of governments in inter-war Europe. However, such 
control has been ignored in recent monetary economics, where debt management is 
reduced to the issue of government paper in the primary market.7 Without such control, the 
financial markets readily become disorderly. The challenge of maintaining order in the 
markets is of course greater when both the financial and the functional budgets are 
operating in deficit. 
 
A fourth outcome is the Mecca of fiscal conservatives in which the government operates an 
overall fiscal surplus, both on the financial account, and on the functional account. The fiscal 
surplus reduces the overall rate of profit and drains liquidity from the non-financial economy, 
resulting in recession. At the same time, the financial surplus exacerbates the conditions of 
financial instability, as the government taxes wealth portfolios more that it is obliged to pay to 
holders of those portfolios, at the same time as that surplus, and the surplus on the 
functional account, are applied to buy in government bonds, or to buy other assets. The 
concentration of corporate liquidity in wealth portfolios, at the same time as risk-free 
government bonds or bills are becoming more scarce, also threatens government control of 
interest rates: an over-issue of bonds, to maintain the long-term rate of interest, in order to 
invest in short term securities (either directly, or through the central bank), would reinforce 
downward pressure on short-term interest rates. 
 









Deficit Surplus Surplus or balance Expansionary fiscal 
contraction 
Surplus Deficit Deficit Contractionary fiscal 
expansion 
Deficit Deficit Large deficit Expansionary 
 
7 An exception here is Allen 2019. See Toporowski 2019. 
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financial instability  





The analysis in this paper applies in the case of borrowing in domestic financial markets. 
The situation is of course considerably more problematic in the case of foreign borrowing. A 
fundamental advantage of domestic financing of government debt, as opposed to foreign 
borrowing, is that domestic borrowing keeps financial resources within the economy. 
Domestic borrowing merely recycles (increases the velocity of circulation of) existing money 
stocks, redistributing them among the wealthy who hold the largest monetary stocks. It fixes 
government borrowing on terms which the government itself determines, through the central 
bank’s control over domestic interest rates. At the same time, the central bank’s open market 
operations allow that bank to control the liquidity of the portfolios of the wealthy, so that 
government bonds may be ‘rolled over’, limiting payments out of the financial budget to 
interest payments. With such government borrowing, it is not that future generations of tax-
payers pay the cost of government expenditure today, but future generations of tax-payers 
paying future generations of government bond-holders. Servicing government debt by 
means of taxes on wealth and adjusted taxes on profits means future generations of the 




The debt management operations of the government should not be viewed in isolation from 
taxes on wealth and profits. Combined with such taxation, debt management can be an 
independent instrument to manage the portfolios of the wealthy in such a way as to maintain 




This fiscal-financial analysis suggests that economic stagnation in rich countries is not so 
much a failure of Keynesianism, as a sign that the wealthy do not pay their dues towards 
servicing government debt, so that governments’ financial resources are diverted from fiscal 
stimulus of the real economy towards financial circulation. At the same time the financial 
instability that plagues poor countries may be because government debt is insufficiently 
domestic and the wealthy are, as in richer countries, insufficiently taxed to pay for debt 
servicing. A financial budget, servicing government debt from taxes on wealth and profits 
that do not affect incomes and expenditures in the economy allows government to manage 
its debts without compromising the economic goals set for fiscal policy in the functional 
budget.  
 
A further conclusion from this analysis concerns the apportionment of taxes among different 
wealth and income classes. With rising government debt and annual debt service 
commitments, such a system of debt management implies that the incidence of taxation 
needs to be adjusted in a progressive direction to maintain the balance in the financial 
operations budget. If this is not done and the financial budget falls into deficit, then the 
redistribution from tax-payers to bond holders becomes regressive and the fiscal stance 
becomes contractionary, even if the overall fiscal balance is in deficit. This may be a factor in 
the recent differing assessments of the fiscal multiplier. 
 
In sum, a disaggregation of the government’s budget identifying a financial budget balance is 
critical not only for the financing of government debt, but also for the effectiveness of fiscal 
policy. A financial budget deficit diverts expenditure from the functional budget to financial 
circulation. So, whether it is the functional fiscal deficit, or the total amount of non-debt 
expenditure that determines the value of the fiscal multiplier, the effectiveness of fiscal 
stimulus is reduced by the deficit in the financial balance. It requires little reflection to show 
that ‘supply-side’ policies, reducing taxes on wealth, profits, and luxury consumption have 
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This is an extended version of ‘Debt Management and the Fiscal Balance’ Policy Note 
2020/5  Levy Economics Institute of Bard College July 2020, pp. 1-4. I am grateful to Robert 
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